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98 N.C. L. REV. F. 1487 (2020) 
THE APPLICATION OF FEDERAL TAX LAW IN 
NORTH CAROLINA TAX CASES* 
WILLIAM W. NELSON 
[The taxing power], I contend, is manifestly a concurrent and coequal 
authority in the United States and in the individual States. 
—Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 32.1 
In 2017, the Supreme Court of North Carolina rendered its decision in 
Fidelity Bank v. North Carolina Department of Revenue.2 The issue presented in 
that case was whether the word “interest” as used in the North Carolina 
Revenue Act3 (the “Revenue Act”) should be construed in accordance with the 
meaning given the term in the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”). The 
court held that absent a “clear and specific reference” in the Revenue Act to 
the Code’s definition of “interest,” that definition did not apply, and the term 
must be construed in accordance with its plain meaning.4 
While the narrow issue in Fidelity Bank was the interpretation of a single 
word, the case shines a revealing light on a large and important question: to 
what extent do federal tax rules control the outcome of North Carolina tax 
controversies? That question is important because taxpayers and the North 
Carolina Department of Revenue (the “Department”) share an interest in 
knowing what law governs a given case. More broadly, the answer to this 
question has important consequences for the state’s ability to prevent the 
erosion of its “concurrent and coequal authority” over the taxing power within 
our federal system. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
The states’ taxing power is a core aspect of their sovereignty—one which 
the ratification of the Constitution left essentially unimpaired. Indeed, the 
Framers were eager to reassure the states on this issue.5 The Constitution 
 
 *  © 2020 William W. Nelson. 
 1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 156 (Alexander Hamilton) (Cary & McClellan eds., 2001). 
 2. 370 N.C. 10, 803 S.E.2d 142 (2017) 
 3. North Carolina’s Revenue Act is contained in Chapter 105 of the North Carolina General 
Statutes. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-1 to 105-570 (2017 & Supp. 2019). 
 4. Fid. Bank, 370 N.C. at 20, 803 S.E.2d at 150. 
 5. As Alexander Hamilton stated in Federalist No. 32: 
[T]he individual states should possess an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise 
their own revenues for the support of their own wants . . . I affirm that (with the sole 
exception of duties on imports or exports) they would retain that authority in the most 
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does, of course, place some limits on state taxing power, such as the express 
prohibition on state import and export duties.6 Other limitations have been 
applied through the Privileges and Immunities Clause,7 the Supremacy 
Clause8 and the Fourteenth Amendment.9 However, the most important 
constitutional limitation on state taxing power is the Commerce Clause.10 In 
the mid-1960s, Congress entertained the idea of using the Commerce Clause 
to impose uniformity on state corporate income tax laws. The states 
vehemently opposed this effort as an affront to their sovereignty, and 
Congress stayed its hand when the states took voluntary steps toward 
uniformity on their own.11 Since then, Congress has been hesitant to use the 
 
absolute and unqualified sense; and that any attempt on the part of the national government 
to abridge them in the exercise of it would be a violent assumption of power unwarranted by 
any article or clause of the Constitution. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 1, at 154 (Alexander Hamilton). In a number of decisions 
beginning in the Marshall era, the Supreme Court entrenched the Hamiltonian view into 
constitutional law. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199 (1824) (“The power of 
taxation . . . is a power which, in its own nature, is capable of residing in, and being exercised by, 
different authorities at the same time. We are accustomed to seeing it placed for different purposes, 
in different hands . . . . This does not interfere with the power of the States to tax for the support of 
their own governments; nor is the exercise of that power by the States an exercise of any portion of 
the power that is granted to the United States.”); see also Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Peniston, 85 U.S. 
(18 Wall.) 5, 29 (1873) (“That the taxing power is one if its attributes of sovereignty; that it exists 
independently of the Constitution of the United States, and underived from that instrument; and 
that it may be exercised to an unlimited extent on all property, trades, business and avocations 
existing or carried on within its territorial boundaries of the State, except so far as it has been 
surrendered to the federal government either expressly or by necessary implication, are propositions 
that have often been asserted by this Court. And in thus acknowledging the extent of the power to 
tax belonging to the states, we have declared that it is indispensable to their continued existence.”). 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; see, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403 (1948) 
(striking down a shrimp boat license fee that discriminated against nonresident boat owners). 
 8. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819) 
(applying the Supremacy Clause to hold that Maryland could not tax notes issued by the Bank of the 
United States). 
 9. See, e.g., Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cty. Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 346 (1989) 
(invalidating under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a property tax 
regime that taxed recently sold parcels at much higher valuations than other parcels). Just this year 
the Court invoked the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to invalidate North Carolina’s 
attempt to tax a foreign trust that had minimal connections to the state. See N.C. Dep’t of Revenue 
v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust, 139 S. Ct. 2213, 2228 (2019). The Court has also 
restricted the states’ ability to tax publications as an infringement of the First Amendment. See 
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Com’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 593 (1983). 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 11. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-952, pt. 6, at 1143 (1964) [hereinafter Willis Commission Report]. 
Known as the “Willis Commission Report,” this report recommended “the enactment [by Congress] 
of legislation providing a workable method of State income taxation of multistate business under 
uniform rules governing division of income, jurisdiction to tax, and the basic definition of taxable 
income.” Id. For the state response to the Willis Commission’s recommendations, see, for example, II 
RICHARD D. POMP, STATE & LOCAL TAXATION 10-04 to -05 (8th ed. 2015). 
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Commerce Clause to regulate state taxation, limiting itself to a small number 
of discrete prohibitions.12 
The Supreme Court has been more active in policing the bounds of state 
taxing power through its dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but it has 
not used that doctrine to promote a “normative state and local tax regime.”13 
Indeed, the Court has recently loosened its Commerce Clause restrictions on 
state taxing power out of respect for state sovereignty.14 As a result, and 
subject always to the possibility that Congress may one day more fully 
exercise its positive Commerce Clause powers, state tax sovereignty remains 
constitutionally robust. To this extent, at least, the Hamiltonian doctrine of 
concurrent and coequal taxing authority is alive and well. 
FORMAL LINKS BETWEEN THE STATE AND FEDERAL TAX SYSTEMS 
Although state autonomy in tax matters may be constitutionally secure, 
North Carolina has voluntarily ceded some of that autonomy to the federal 
government. 
The state’s Individual Income Tax15 and the Corporation Income Tax16 
share a common tax base with their federal counterparts. The starting point 
for computing North Carolina income is federal adjusted gross income (for 
individuals) and federal taxable income (for corporations), both as determined 
under the Code.17 Adopting the federal tax base creates efficiencies for 
taxpayers and the Department. Taxpayers are able to compute their income 
for federal and state purposes under a single set of rules. The Department, by 
requiring taxpayers to report changes to their federal returns resulting from a 
federal audit,18 can rely on the Internal Revenue Service to police the common 
tax base. 
 
 12. See, e.g., Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. C, tit. XI, 112 Stat. 2681-719 
(1998) (amended 2007) (prohibiting state internet access taxes and discriminatory taxes on internet 
transactions); Interstate Income Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (prohibiting states 
from imposing income taxes on nonresident persons engaged in interstate commerce with minimal 
contacts to the taxing state) . 
 13. William F. Fox & John A. Swain, The Federal Role in State Taxation: A Normative Approach, 
60 NAT’L TAX J. 611, 619 (2007). For instance, while taxes on interstate actors must be fairly 
apportioned, the Court has tolerated a wide variety of apportionment systems. See, e.g., Moorman 
Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280–81 (1978) (upholding single sales factor apportionment). 
 14. In last year’s decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018), the Court 
described the judge-made rule that states could not impose sales tax collection obligations on remote 
sellers without an in-state physical presence as “an extraordinary imposition by the Judiciary on 
States’ authority to collect taxes and perform critical public functions.” Id. at 2086. 
 15. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-153.1 to -159 (2017). 
 16. See id. §§ 105-130 to -130.25. Income taxes are also imposed on trusts and estates. See id. 
§§ 105-160 to -160.8. 
 17. Id. §§ 105-130.5, -153.4. 
 18. See id. §§ 105-130.20, -159. 
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In addition to tax base conformity, North Carolina tends to borrow 
specific rules and definitions from the Code.19 The Code thus serves as a sort 
of tax thesaurus for state legislative drafters. For instance, North Carolina has 
special rules governing related-party royalty payments, which rely on Code 
definitions and attribution rules to determine when two parties are related.20 
The Revenue Act also relies on more general aspects of the federal tax system. 
For instance, in computing state net income, corporations are required to 
employ tax accounting methods that “follow as nearly as practicable the 
federal practice.”21 Resorting to these federal rules can save time for legislative 
drafters and provide efficiencies to taxpayers familiar with the federal 
concepts. 
These formal links between the federal and state income tax systems 
have not appreciably diminished North Carolina’s autonomy in tax matters. In 
addition to the income tax, North Carolina levies a variety of taxes that have 
no direct federal counterpart.22 These include the Franchise Tax,23 the 
Insurance Company Gross Premiums Tax,24 and various privilege and excise 
taxes.25 In addition, the Sales and Use Tax,26 which is the state’s second largest 
tax in terms of revenue contributed to the General Fund,27 and the Property 
Tax,28 which provides local governments with a major source of revenue, have 
no federal counterparts. These taxes are generally administered without 
reference to—and remain free from—the influence of federal tax law. 
Even with respect to the income tax, state conformity to the federal tax 
base has its limits. The North Carolina Constitution prohibits delegation of 
the state’s taxing power.29 The General Assembly thus is required annually to 
review amendments made to the Code and pick and choose those to which it 
 
 19. The Revenue Act includes over one hundred specific references to the Code. See generally id. 
§ 105. 
 20. See id. § 105-130.7A (referencing Code §§ 318, 1563(b)). 
 21. Id. § 105-130.15(a). 
 22. See generally id. §§ 105-1 to -270. 
 23. See id. §§ 105.114 to -129. 
 24. See id. §§ 105-228.3 to -228.10. 
 25. These include the various privilege taxes levied under Article 2 of Subchapter I of the 
Revenue Act, the Tobacco Products Tax (Article 2A), the Alcoholic Beverage License and Excise 
Taxes (Article 2B), the Unauthorized Substance Taxes (Article 2D), the Highway Use Tax (Article 
5A), the Scrap Tire Disposal Tax (Article 5C), the Dry Cleaning Solvent Tax (Article 5D), the Piped 
Natural Gas Tax (Article 5E), the Solid Waste Disposal Tax (Article 5G), the Severance Tax (Article 
5I), and the Excise Tax on Conveyances (Article 8E). 
 26. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-164.1 to -164.44M (2017). 
 27. See N.C. DEPT. OF REVENUE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF NORTH CAROLINA TAXES 
2018, at 11 (advance ed. 2018). 
 28. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-271 to -395.1. 
 29. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1) (“The power of taxation . . . shall never be surrendered, 
suspended, or contracted away.”) 
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wishes to conform.30 The annual review is more than a pro forma exercise. 
The federal government’s willingness to borrow allows it to tolerate more 
erosion of the tax base than the state can accept without raising rates. The 
General Assembly therefore regularly “decouples” from base-eroding 
measures such as the federal bonus depreciation and expensing regimes.31 
North Carolina has also changed the starting point for computing individual 
state taxable income from federal taxable income to federal adjusted gross 
income, thus ensuring the state’s control over the deductions and exemptions 
available to individual taxpayers.32 
THE INFORMAL INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL TAX LAW 
The federal influence on North Carolina’s tax law is not limited to the 
common tax base and other formal links between the two systems. Federal tax 
law also exerts an informal influence on state tax law. The Revenue Act and 
the Code inevitably use a common vocabulary to describe or classify tax-
related concepts, such as “interest,” “dividends,” “partner,” and “lease.” In 
addition, the state and federal income tax regimes must be applied to common 
situations. For instance, under both state and federal systems it may be 
necessary to determine whether the form of or label given to a particular 
transaction by the taxpayer should be respected, whether a taxpayer is acting 
in his own capacity or as an agent or conduit of another, or whether a 
transaction or arrangement has economic substance. 
Tax practitioners often tend to assume that, absent a specific statutory 
directive, commonly used terms should be given the same meaning and that 
the evaluation of a transaction or arrangement should yield similar results 
under both tax regimes. As a result, tax lawyers and administrators tend to 
apply federal tax concepts to state tax issues without much careful thought as 
to whether the concepts have any basis in state law.33 
This tendency simply reflects the fact that state income tax laws are 
drafted and administered against the background of the much more 
thoroughly developed federal income tax system, including its vast regulatory, 
sub-regulatory and judicial components. As one federal report noted as early 
as 1964, because of its high rates and significance for all taxpayers, “the 
Federal income tax has become such a universally experienced and highly 
 
 30. This is done by annually updating the definition of the term “Code” in section 105-228.90 
of the Revenue Act. 
 31. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-130.5B, -153.6. 
 32. The limitation of the federal deduction for state and local taxes enacted as part of the 2017 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, while motivated by reasons unrelated to state tax sovereignty, also has served 
to disentangle the state and federal tax systems. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-
97, 111 Stat. 2054 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 33. See generally Jeffrey C. Glickman & Clark R. Calhoun, The “States” of the Federal Common 
Law Tax Doctrines, 61 TAX L. 1181 (2008). 
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significant fact of business life that it has come to dominate the entire field of 
income taxation.”34 
The informal influence of the federal tax system on state tax law is more 
difficult to monitor or even observe than the formal influences. It therefore 
has the potential to sew confusion and even to erode state tax sovereignty to a 
degree that is not fully appreciated. Fidelity Bank illustrates how taxpayers can 
be led astray by assuming state adherence to federal tax concepts. 
FIDELITY BANK 
The issue in Fidelity Bank was whether the term “interest” as used in 
section 105-130.5(b)(1) of the Revenue Act should be interpreted to give the 
term the same breadth it has under the Code.35 The taxpayer, a corporation, 
had purchased United States government bonds below their face value and 
held them until maturity. For federal purposes, the amount by which the face 
value of a debt instrument exceeds its purchase price is referred to as “market 
discount”36 and, with limited exceptions, is treated as interest.37 
The North Carolina Corporation Income Tax is imposed on a 
corporation’s “State net income,” defined as the taxpayer’s “federal taxable 
income as determined under the Code” with certain adjustments.38 One 
adjustment permits the subtraction of “interest” earned upon obligations of 
the United States.39 
The taxpayer argued that its market discount income was interest and 
that because the income was earned on U.S. government bonds, it could be 
subtracted in computing sate net income. The taxpayer reasoned that because 
North Carolina uses federal taxable income “as determined under the Code” 
as the starting point for computing state net income, the General Assembly 
must have intended that the term “interest” as used in the Revenue Act be 
interpreted in accordance with the Code to include market discount income. 
The Department made a strong argument that federal tax rules had no 
role in resolving the issue: 
 
 34. Willis Commission Report, supra note 11, at 255. 
 35. Fid. Bank v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 370 N.C. 10, 11, 16, 803 S.E.2d 142, 143, 147 (2017). 
 36. See I.R.C. § 1278(a)(2) (2012). This provision was added to the Code by the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986. See Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1803(a)(6), 100 Stat. 2085, 2793 (1986) (codified as amended 
at I.R.C. § 1278 (2012)). Before this amendment, any amount received by a bondholder at maturity 
attributable to market discount was treated as capital gain. See generally DAVID C. GARLOCK ET AL., 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF DEBT INSTRUMENTS, ¶1101 (2019). 
 37. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 1276(a)(4) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-66). 
 38. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-130.2(15), -130.5 (2017 & Supp. 2019); Act of August 1, 2019, 
ch. 187, § 1.(g) 2019-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 198, 202 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 105-130.5(a)(30)). 
 39. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.5(b)(1). 
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The North Carolina General Assembly has never adopted the Code 
wholesale . . . . The fundamental premise of Fidelity’s argument—that 
the North Carolina Revenue Act generally adopts the federal Code’s 
definitions—is incorrect. No provision of the Revenue Act incorporates 
the federal Code for all purposes. Instead, the Revenue Act selectively 
incorporates only certain provisions of the Code.40 
The Department argued that the taxpayer was grossly overreading the 
reference to “federal taxable income as determined under the Code.”41 That 
reference, the Department argued, cannot be read to incorporate federal tax 
principles for the purposes of interpreting the items to be subtracted from 
federal taxable income in computing state net income.42 
The Department also pointed to the many places in the Revenue Act 
where the legislature specifically adopted a Code definition. Under the 
principle of expressio unius, the General Assembly’s failure to expressly adopt 
the Code’s definition of “interest” must be viewed as intentional.43 
Finally, and most generally, the Department noted that “[t]he provision 
of the federal Code on which Fidelity relies, by its terms, does not extend to 
North Carolina law.”44 
Because the General Assembly had left the term “interest” undefined—
by failing either to incorporate the federal definition or to supply a definition 
of its own, the Department argued that the case should be decided by applying 
the normal rules of statutory construction.45 Undefined terms used in the 
Revenue Act “do not take on any specialized meaning they might have under 
the Code.”46 Rather, they must be interpreted in accordance with their 
“ordinary meaning.”47 The ordinary meaning of “interest,” according to the 
Department, is limited to “periodic payments” and does not include lump-sum 
amounts received at maturity.48 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina accepted the Department’s 
arguments in full. Applying general rules of statutory construction, the court 
found that the term “interest” is unambiguous and therefore must be given its 
plain meaning.49 In determining that the plain meaning of the term was 
 
 40. See Brief for Respondent-Appellee at 18–19, Fid. Bank, 370 N.C. 10, 803 S.E.2d 142 (Nos. 
392A16, 393PA16). 
 41. Id.at 18–25. 
 42. Id. at 21–22. 
 43. Id. at 22–24. 
 44. Id. at 24. 
 45. See id. at 29. 
 46. Id. at 21. 
 47. Id. at 23. 
 48. Id. at 16. 
 49. Fid. Bank v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 370 N.C. 10, 18–19, 803 S.E.2d 142, 148–49 (2017). 
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“periodic payments received by the holder of a bond,”50 the court ignored a 
large body of federal tax law and looked solely to state law precedents, 
specifically, a decision from 1874 involving a creditor’s action against a surety 
on a demand note providing for annual interest payments and a state statute 
providing for the monthly accrual of interest on delayed payments to 
contractors on public construction contracts.51 
The court found no evidence of a legislative intent to incorporate federal 
tax concepts. Any decision to follow the federal definition “requires specific 
support in the relevant statutory language.”52 Specifically, “when the General 
Assembly intends to adopt provisions or definitions from other sources of law 
into a statute, it does so by ‘clear and specific reference.’”53 The court found 
no such reference to the Code’s “interest” definition.54 
The court was untroubled by the fact that its holding created an 
inconsistency between the state and federal tax systems. “[T]he fact that 
Market Discount Income is treated as interest for purposes of determining 
federal taxable income does not . . . mean that Market Discount Income 
should be treated as ‘interest’ for all purposes under the North Carolina 
Revenue Act.”55 There is also “nothing illogical,” the court reasoned, about 
treating the term differently for federal and state tax purposes.56 
Fidelity Bank is thus important both for establishing the principle that 
Code provisions are not incorporated into the Revenue Act absent a “clear and 
specific” statutory reference and for construing terms used in the Revenue Act 
by resorting to state law precedents without regard to the halo of federal tax 
lore that may surround them. 
To a federal tax lawyer, limiting interest to “periodic payments” is a 
surprising result. For federal tax purposes, interest includes any amount 
 
 50. Id. at 20, 803 S.E.2d at 150. The court expressly adopted the Business Court’s conclusion 
that the “plain meaning” of “interest” is periodic payments received by the holder of a bond. Id. 
Neither the Business Court nor the Supreme Court of North Carolina cited a source for this 
definition. 
 51. Id. (citing Knight v. Braswell, 70 N.C. 709, 711–12 (1874)); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-
134.1(a) (2017). 
 52. Fid. Bank, 370 N.C. at 21, 803 S.E.2d at 150. 
 53. Id. at 19, 803 S.E.2d at 149–50 (quoting Lutz Indus. v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 
340, 88 S.E.2d 333, 339 (1955)). 
 54. The court’s holding was not entirely novel. In In re North Carolina Inheritance Taxes, the 
court observed in connection with the construction of the term “debts of the decedent” in North 
Carolina’s former inheritance tax law that “[w]hile the federal [estate tax] provisions provide some 
guidance, absent a clear indication of legislative intent to parallel federal law by use of identical 
language or otherwise, we cannot accept federal law as controlling.” 303 N.C. 102, 107, 277 S.E.2d 
403, 408 (1981). Fidelity Bank represents a refinement of this approach by refusing to consider the 
Revenue Act’s use of the same term used in the Code as an indication of legislative intent to adopt 
the Code’s definition of the term. 
 55. Fid. Bank, 370 N.C. at 21, 803 S.E.2d at 150. 
 56. Id. 
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payable to a lender to compensate the lender for the use of its money, 
regardless of when paid.57 To reach its conclusion in Fidelity Bank, the court 
had to ignore many years of federal income tax history. 
In 1932, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision in Old 
Colony Railroad Co. v. Commissioner,58 which is strikingly analogous to Fidelity 
Bank. The case concerned the federal income tax treatment of market 
premium rather than market discount.59 The taxpayer issued bonds at a 
premium above their stated principal amount, reflecting an above-market 
nominal interest rate payable on the bonds.60 The taxpayer argued that the 
“interest” it was entitled to deduct was the nominal interest paid on the 
bonds.61 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue argued that the premium 
should be amortized over the life of the bonds, effectively adjusting the 
nominal interest rate downward and reducing the taxpayer’s interest 
deductions.62 
The Court, in the same manner as the state supreme court in Fidelity 
Bank, applied normal rules of statutory construction and the “known and 
ordinary signification” of statutory terms.63 
In the ordinary affairs of life, no one stops for a refined analysis of the 
nature of a premium, or considers that the periodic payment universally 
called “interest” is in part something wholly distinct — that is, a return 
of borrowed capital. It has remained for the theory of accounting to 
point out this refinement. We cannot believe that Congress used the 
word having in mind any concept other than the usual, ordinary, and 
everyday meaning of the term, or that it was acquainted with the 
accountants’ phrase “effective rate” of interest, and intended that as the 
measure of the permitted deduction.64 
Any federal tax lawyer today would smile at such a quaint result. Indeed, 
the result was effectively reversed by regulations issued in 1957.65 In 1965, the 
 
 57. See Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 498 (1940) (defining interest as “compensation for 
the use or forbearance of money”); see also GARLOCK ET AL., supra note 36, at ¶1101. As this treatise 
also points out, the federal rule treating all market discount as interest is also objectionable, since 
market discount may reflect a decline in the issuer’s creditworthiness rather than a change in interest 
rates. In such a case the discount may reflect the potential for collecting less than the full amount of 
principal at maturity. Id. 
 58. 284 U.S. 552 (1932). 
 59. Id. at 557. 
 60. Id. at 558. 
 61. Id. at 559. 
 62. Id. at 555. 
 63. Id. at 560. 
 64. Id. at 560–61. 
 65. See T.D. 6272, 1957-2 C.B. 18, reprinted in 22 Fed. Reg. 9418 (Nov. 26, 1957) (codified as 
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(c) (1957)). The current rules requiring issuers to amortize bond premium as an 
offset to their interest deductions are found in Treas. Reg. § 1.163-13 (1960). 
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Supreme Court recanted, recognizing that original issue discount on a zero 
coupon bond was interest rather than capital gain, and disavowing its 
primitive statements in Old Colony by noting that “[t]he concept of discount or 
premium as altering the effective rate of interest is not to be rejected as an 
‘esoteric concept derived from subtle theoretic analysis.’”66 These 
developments have been described as a “process under which specific federal 
tax law concepts have supplanted common law notions of what constitutes 
interest for tax purposes.”67 
That the Supreme Court of North Carolina in 2017 found itself in the 
same place the United States Supreme Court had occupied in 1932 and had 
since abandoned by 1965 illustrates the degree to which federal tax law has 
outpaced state tax law. More importantly, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina’s willingness to ignore decades of federal tax development 
demonstrates the strength of its commitment to deciding state tax issues solely 
by reference to state law. 
THE SCOPE OF FIDELITY BANK 
The Code, of course, is not the only source of federal tax law. It is 
supplemented by a vast and ever-expanding library of tax regulations, revenue 
rulings, revenue procedures, technical advice memoranda and other 
administrative interpretations. If, under Fidelity Bank, the General Assembly 
cannot be assumed to have incorporated the Code en bloc into the Revenue 
Act, it should go without saying that none of this administrative matter has 
any direct force in North Carolina tax law absent a “clear and specific” 
statutory reference. 
When states have wished to sanction reliance on federal administrative 
tax law, they have typically done so by specific enactments. For instance, a 
Colorado statute provides not only that any term used in the Colorado 
revenue law shall have the same meaning “as when used in a comparable 
manner in the internal revenue code” but also that: 
[d]ue consideration shall be given in the interpretation of this article to 
applicable sections of the internal revenue code in effect from time to 
time and to federal rulings and regulations interpreting such sections if 
 
 66. United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 61 (1965) (quoting Old Colony R.R. Co., 
284 U.S. at 561). Congress began the process of requiring deferred payments to be treated as interest 
by enacting Code § 483 in 1964. See Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 224(a), 78 Stat. 19, 
77 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 483 (2012)). Section 483 was supplemented by enactment of the 
original issue discount rules in 1969, which were significantly amended in 1982 and 1984. See Tax 
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 41–44, 98 Stat. 494, 531–59 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
248, § 231(a), 98 Stat. 324, 496 (repealed 1984); Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 
§ 413(a), 83 Stat. 487, 609 (repealed 1984). 
 67. See GARLOCK ET AL., supra note 36, ¶101.02[A]. 
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such statute, rulings, and regulations do not conflict with the provisions 
of this article.68 
The wisdom of such a wholesale incorporation of federal administrative 
guidance, and even its legality under non-delegation principles, could be 
debated. But—suffice it to say—it has no counterpart in North Carolina law.69 
The decisions of the United States Tax Court and the tax decisions of 
the other federal courts are another important source of federal tax law. 
Federal judicial decisions in tax matters may, among other things, supply 
meaning to undefined terms,70 reorder transactions,71 or ignore transactions as 
mere shams.72 Some states have authorized the application of federal judicial 
tax decisions to resolve state tax matters.73 North Carolina has not.74 
If federal tax opinions are to be given effect in state tax matters, care 
must be taken to identify which decisions are to be followed. Oregon, for 
instance, has adopted rules for resolving conflicts between federal courts in 
determining which federal decisions are to be applied in state cases.75 Giving 
effect to federal judicial decisions without specific rules of this sort necessarily 
would lead to confusion. North Carolina’s lack of any rules for reconciling 
inconsistent federal opinions is evidence that the legislature does not intend 
them to have any application in state tax cases. 
The lesson, then, of Fidelity Bank is that none of the Code, federal 
administrative tax law, nor federal judicial tax decisions have any direct 
 
 68. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-22-103(11) (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.). Kentucky 
and Maryland also specifically incorporate federal administrative tax rulings. See KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 141.050 (Westlaw through 2019 First Extraordinary Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. 
§ 10-107 (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.). 
 69. North Carolina law does require the application of federal regulatory tax guidance in 
discrete cases. For example, the Secretary of Revenue is required to apply “the standards contained in 
the regulations adopted under section 482 of the Code” to determine whether transactions between 
affiliates are at arm’s length. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.5A(h) (2017). 
 70. See, e.g., Higgins v. Comm’r, 312 U.S. 212, 215 (1941) (interpreting “trade or business”). 
 71. The locus classicus is Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, treating a stock purchase 
followed by a liquidation as an asset purchase. 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951). This case has been 
superseded by the enactment of Code section 338. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 224, 96 Stat. 324, 485 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 338 (2012)). 
 72. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949). 
 73. Kentucky authorizes the use of “judicial interpretations of the federal income tax law,” KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.050, and Maryland provides that “[t]o the extent practicable, the 
Comptroller shall apply . . . judicial interpretations of the federal income tax law to the 
administration of the income tax laws of this State,” MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 10-107. 
 74. Rather than authorizing application of federal judicial tax doctrines, some states have 
enacted their own broad anti-abuse doctrines into law. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 62C, 
§ 3A (Westlaw through 2019 legislation). North Carolina has enacted its own economic substance 
doctrine for the limited purpose of determining whether corporations may be required to file a 
combined return. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.5A(g). 
 75. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 314.011(3) (Westlaw through 2018 Special Sess. of the 79th 
Legis. Assemb.). 
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application to the resolution of state tax issues.76 Any one or more of these 
authorities, of course, may be incorporated into North Carolina law by a “clear 
and specific” statutory reference; the reasoning behind them may certainly be 
noticed by state courts deciding state cases; and the Department may adopt 
similar guidance through rulemaking—all without giving the federal 
authorities direct application. To apply federal authorities directly to state tax 
matters would avoid the difficulty, but also the legitimacy, of actual 
lawmaking.77 
AN UNLEARNED LESSON 
An “Important Notice” issued by the Department in September 2018 
shows that the lesson of Fidelity Bank has not yet been fully absorbed.78 
 
 76. An exception could be justified with respect to the common tax base. The phrase “as 
determined under the Code” can plausibly be read to require the application of federal administrative 
and judicial interpretations of the Code provisions that govern the calculation of federal taxable 
income (for corporations) or federal adjusted gross income (for individuals). Application of a separate 
set of state-specific interpretive rules would defeat the purpose of the common tax base and would 
therefore arguably be contrary to legislative intent. The Department generally relies on the Internal 
Revenue Service audit process to police the common tax base. However, the Revenue Act does not 
preclude the Department from making an assessment, or the taxpayer from seeking a refund, in the 
absence of a federal determination. In these cases, the Department must apply federal Treasury 
Regulations and other federal guidance on its own. See, e.g., In re Proposed Assessment of Corp. Income 
Taxes for Tax Years Ended Dec. 31, 1989 and 1990 by the Sec’y of Revenue of N.C., 1997 N.C. Tax Lexis 
48, No. 95-144 (N.C. Dep’t of Revenue Aug. 26, 1997) (claiming the ability to apply federal judicial 
tax doctrines to independently redetermine a taxpayer’s federal taxable income). This circumstance 
presents a separate issue. The Department’s interpretations of the “laws administered by the 
Secretary [of Revenue]” are prima facie correct. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-264(a) (2017). But it must 
be doubted whether the state’s adoption of the federal tax base makes the Secretary’s interpretations 
of Code provisions prima facie correct. Taxpayers challenging an assessment or a refund denial based 
on the Department’s independent interpretation of the Code should not be required to overcome a 
presumption of correctness. See Martin v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 194 N.C. App. 
716, 720, 670 S.E.2d 629, 632 (2009) (“A state agency’s interpretation of federal statutes” will not be 
given “the deference afforded a federal agency’s interpretation of its own statutes.” (quoting GTE 
South, Inc. v. Morrison, 199 F.3d 733, 745 (4th Cir. 1999))). 
 77. Under the North Carolina Constitution, “[o]nly the General Assembly shall have the power 
to classify property for taxation.” N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(2). This provision has been interpreted to 
mean that the state’s taxing power must be exercised by the legislature. See, e.g., Hajoca Corp. v. 
Clayton, 277 N.C. 560, 568, 178 S.E.2d 481, 486 (1971); De Loatch v. Beamon, 252 N.C. 754, 757, 
114 S.E.2d 711, 713 (1960); Henderson Cty. v. Smyth, 216 N.C. 421, 5 S.E.2d 136, 137–38 (1939); 
Person v. Bd. of State Tax Comm’rs, 184 N.C. 499, 502, 115 S.E. 336, 339 (1922). It could be argued 
that an attempt by the Department, even through formal rulemaking, to incorporate federal judicial 
decisions or administrative guidance would exceed its mandate to interpret state law and 
unconstitutionally intrude into the legislative sphere. 
 78. N.C. DEP’T OF REVENUE, IMPORTANT NOTICE: TAX CREDITS INVOLVING 
PARTNERSHIPS (2018), https://files.nc.gov/ncdor/documents/files/tax_credits_important
_notice_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/27J7-WSKJ]. An “Important Notice” is a “nonbinding interpretive 
statement within the delegated authority of an agency that merely define[s], interpret[s], or 
explain[s] the meaning of a statute or rule.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-2(8a)c. 
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The notice concerns partnerships engaging in activities giving rise to 
North Carolina tax credits and passing those credits through to their partners 
through partnership allocations. The notice discusses two situations in which, 
according to the Department, an investor in such a partnership would not be 
entitled to claim his allocable share of the credit generated by the 
partnership.79 The first is where the investor is not in fact a “bona fide 
partner” in the partnership.80 The second is where the investor, though a bona 
fide partner, purchases the credit from the partnership through a “disguised 
sale” rather than receiving it through a partnership allocation.81 
The Revenue Act does not include any rules under which a partner’s 
status may be ignored as not being “bona fide” or treating purported 
partnership allocations as “disguised sales.” Moreover, the North Carolina 
courts have not developed a body of tax law on these issues, and the 
Department has not addressed them through rulemaking. 
There is, however, federal income tax law on both issues. The federal 
courts have issued a number of decisions addressing an investor’s “bona fide” 
partner status,82 and Code § 707 and the Treasury Regulations issued 
thereunder contain elaborate rules for treating certain transactions between 
partners and partnerships as disguised sales.83 The Revenue Act, however, 
does not include any “clear and specific reference” either to Code § 707 or the 
federal bona fide partner doctrine. Until North Carolina develops its own law 
on these matters, by legislation, administrative rulemaking, litigation, or 
enacting a clear and specific reference to the federal law, these concepts are 
simply not a part of North Carolina law. 
The Important Notice nevertheless attempts to incorporate these federal 
rules into North Carolina law by turning Fidelity Bank on its head. The clear 
doctrine of Fidelity Bank (and the argument the Department forcefully 
advocated in that case) is that federal conformity is the exception and state 
independence in tax matters is the rule. The Important Notice states the 
opposite: “North Carolina generally follows the Code, subject to statutory 
exceptions and definitional differences.” In other words, state adherence to 
the Code is the rule absent a statutory exception. Based on this extraordinary 
misreading of Fidelity Bank, the notice states that “section 707 of the Code and 
the regulations thereunder” apply directly to determine whether a partner can 
 
 79. Id. at 1–2. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC v. Comm’r, 694 F.3d 425, 445 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 83. See generally I.R.C. § 707 (2012) (discussing transactions between a partner and the 
partnership); Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3 (1992) (defining when transfer of property by a partner to a 
partnership will be treated as a sale of property for tax purposes). 
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claim a partnership-generated North Carolina tax credit.84 The notice also 
refers to Virginia Historic Tax Credit Fund 2001 LP v. Commissioner,85 a federal 
judicial decision that applied Code § 707, and states that because it “is a 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, the case is controlling for North 
Carolina.”86 Of course, Fourth Circuit decisions are controlling for the 
resolution of federal tax issues for North Carolina residents, but there is no 
authority for referring to such decisions as controlling for state tax purposes.87 
The notice goes on to refer to a federal income tax decision from the 
Third Circuit88 addressing the bona fide partner issue and advises taxpayers 
that this decision is “relevant” in determining whether a partnership investor 
may validly claim a North Carolina tax credit passed through from the 
partnership.89 The notice does not explain why the decision is “relevant” other 
than as an interesting data point, or why it is any more “relevant” for North 
Carolina tax law than the Tax Court decision it reversed, which for federal 
purposes controls outside the Third Circuit.90 
That the Department issued this notice after successfully advocating the 
contrary position in Fidelity Bank just one year before illustrates how easily 
state tax administrators can lose sight of the independence of the law they 
administer in the face of a federal system that “dominates the field.” 
CONCLUSION 
The Department’s 2018 Important Notice highlights the confusion that 
continues to cloud the issue of when federal tax authorities may be applied to 
resolve North Carolina tax cases. The complete resolution of the issue likely 
will require additional judicial development or legislative action. While 
Fidelity Bank therefore might not be the last word, it should awaken North 
 
 84. Before its repeal by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, § 708(b)(1)(B) of the Code provided for the 
technical termination of a partnership if more than half of the partnership interests were sold or 
exchanged in a twelve-month period. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 
§ 13504(a), 111 Stat. 2054, 2142 (striking portions of I.R.C. § 708(b)). The Important Notice also states 
that § 708(b)(1)(B), before its repeal, was “also applicable” for North Carolina tax purposes, and that 
a partnership suffering a technical termination for federal purposes “would lose its allocable [state] 
tax credits.” N.C. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 78, at 2. 
 85. 639 F.3d 129 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 86. N.C. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 78, at 2. 
 87. See supra at note 67 and accompanying text (noting a possible exception where the case is 
relevant to the determination of the common tax base). It is also important to note that Fourth 
Circuit precedent is not necessarily applicable to North Carolina taxpayers investing in a partnership 
that has its principal place of business in another circuit, a subtlety that highlights the danger of the 
direct application of federal precedent to state tax cases without clear ordering rules. See I.R.C. 
§ 7482(b)(1)(E) (Supp. III 2015); Peat Oil & Gas Assocs. v. Comm’r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2259 
(1993), aff’d sub nom. Ferguson v. Comm’r, 29 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 88. Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC v. Comm’r, 694 F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 89. N.C. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 78, at 2. 
 90. See Golsen v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff’d 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971). 
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Carolina tax lawyers from their dogmatic slumbers. As Justice Holmes said of 
the common law, the federal tax law is not a “brooding omnipresence in the 
sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be 
identified.”91 No matter how articulately or how loudly the federal tax law 




 91. C.f. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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